Bertrand Patenaude didn’t intend to teach war. Instead, war found him.

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After a PhD in History from Stanford, his career path was essentially set: teach Russian or European history somewhere. But when he took a colleague’s offer to teach at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterrey, his perspective changed.

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He found it like a second PhD, as he began to take on classes from other professors and expand his own course offerings, until he ended up teaching 17 different courses over the course of eight years.

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Student Dynamic

Many of his students were former military members themselves, and as such, had fun making fun of the “California culture” that he exuded. Not having been around many military people beforehand, Bertrand was able to learn much more directly about concepts he’d only heard of before. For example, when he taught in class about the no-fly-zone in Iraq, some of his students had flown it, and know personally the cost of a campaign.

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The first day of class, walking in to a room full of men and women in uniforms was intimidating. But he enjoyed how the students responded “sir, yes sir,” to what he would say.

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However, he grew to understand that a hand raised and a “sir, with all respect sir,” would soon become a correction—and he appreciated having the chance to learn firsthand from the soldiers he taught.

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After eight years, he came back to Stanford.

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Now, as a Hoover Fellow here, he’s bringing his ideas in two ways: with a strong historical component to his classes in how people thought at the time, but tempered with unfolding events of today.

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Ideas

You can’t understand the risks, limitations, or expectations of current day issues without history, he says. You have to see the whole trajectory to realize what force might be necessary, the pitfalls that might present themselves, and the ideas you must investigate.

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He was thinking about whether war was necessary the morning I interviewed him, all whilst brushing his teeth, he says.

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He wouldn’t call himself a pacifist. As far as a war he thinks was justified, he turns to Kosovo in 1999: to him, the war was justified, urgent and necessary because the U.S. government (and the world) knew what the then-Belgrade government was capable of. The way this war was fought, in his opinion, is questionable, but he maintains that at some points, you need to go to war.

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The main considerations? If war is done for a just cause (a point of contention), if it’s executed properly, with a proportional use of force, and in time to achieve the main goal (to Bertrand, primarily humanitarian intervention, often to stop a genocide or intervene in famine).

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You want your diplomacy backed by a credible threat of force, he says, and sometimes, that means you must use it.

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But many people only speak of military power, and neglect another important aspect: soft power. A term coined by Joseph Nye at Harvard, soft power implements all other tools in the U.S. metaphorical diplomat toolbox, like compromise, cultural capital, working through the U.N., supporting NGOs (non-governmental organizations), and others.

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Ultimately, war shouldn’t be a zero-sum game, and it shouldn’t be intended to destroy everything in sight, he says. To him, war should create something, or rebuild a system better than it ever was.